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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Gamino conditionally admitted to violating his probation but asserts that
the district court lacked jurisdiction to extend his probation. He appeals from the
district court's denial of his motion to dismiss his probation violation.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Gamino and his friends burglarized the Carey School in Carey, Idaho to
obtain money to purchase drugs.

(R., pp. 9-16; PSI, p. 2.)

They stole

approximately $2500 in cash, a laptop computer, a digital camera, and several
other items. (R., p. 10.) The damage to the school was significant. (R. p. 10.)
Gamino was charged with 2 counts of burglary and 1 count of grand theft.
(R., pp. 31-33.) Gamino pled guilty to burglary pursuant to a plea agreement with
the state. (R., pp. 34-36.) The state agreed to recommend a 5 year sentence,
with 3 years fixed, suspend the sentence and to place Gamino on probation with
30 days county jail time. (R., p. 35; 5/10/04 Tr., p. 4, L. 20

- p. 5, L. 2.)

On May

10, 2004, the district court sentenced Gamino to 7 years with 5 years fixed,
suspended the sentence, and placed Gamino on 4 years of supervised
probation.

(R., pp. 46-50.)

The district court also ordered Gamino to pay

$7,221.25 in restitution to Carey School. (R., p. 53.) The restitution order stated
that Gamino pay the restitution on a "schedule to be determined by the
defendant's probation officer and prior to the defendant's release from probation."
(R., p. 63.)

The state filed a petition to revoke Gamino's probation on July 21, 2005.
(R., pp. 85-86.) On October 24, 2005, Gamino admitted that he violated his
probation. (R., p. 134.) The district court did not revoke Gamino's probation but
rather continued Gamino's probation under the same terms and conditions as
previously imposed. (R., p. 140.)
The state signed its second petition to revoke Gamino's probation on May
9,2008 (R., p. 157), and the document was delivered to the judge's chambers for
the judge's signature that same day (8111/08 Tr., p. 19, L. 4 - p. 20, L. 12). The
district court judge signed the petition to revoke probation on May 14, 2008, and
it was filed on May 16, 2008. (R., pp. 156-58.) The second probation violation
alleged that Gamino had failed to pay his restitution and costs of supervision as
previously ordered. (R., pp. 182-83.)
Gamino filed a motion to dismiss the probation violation for lack of
timeliness, asserting that his probation expired on May 10, 2008, and that the
petition was not filed until May 16, 2008. (R., pp. 190-91.) The district court
denied Gamino's motion to dismiss probation violation (R., p. 193), and on
September 15, 2008, Gamino entered a conditional admission to his probation
violation, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss (R., p.
195). The district court extended Gamino's probation for a period of 2 years with
the caveat that Gamino could be released from probation early upon payment of
all previously ordered restitution and costs of supervision. (R., pp. 199-200.)
Gamino timely appealed. (R., pp. 201-04.)

ISSUES
Gamino states the issue on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Gamino's motion to
dismiss where probation had expired by the time the State filed its
petition to revoke probation?

(Appellant's brief, p. 3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Gamino failed to show that the district court erred by denying
his motion to dismiss the petition to revoke probation?

ARGUMENT
Gamino Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied His
Motion To Dismiss The Petition To Revoke Probation
A.

Introduction
The district court sentenced Gamino to 4 years supervised probation on

May 10, 2004.

The companion restitution order, entered at the same time,

ordered Gamino to pay restitution on a "schedule to be determined by the
defendant's probation officer and prior to the defendant's release from probation."
(R., p. 63.) Gamino asserts that because his probation ended on May 10,2008,
and the petition to revoke his probation was not file-stamped until May 16, 2008,
that the district court did not have jurisdiction to extend his probation.
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) He claims that the district court erred in applying ldaho
Code
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19-2602 in revoking his probation rather than ldaho Code § 20-222.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 5-6.) Gamino has failed to show error. The district court
had jurisdiction to revoke Gamino's probation under either statute, and properly
applied ldaho Code § 19-2602 in revoking Gamino's probation.
B.

Standard of Review
Questions of statutory interpretation are given free review. State v. Beard,

135 ldaho 641,646,22 P.3d 116,121 (Ct. App. 2001).

C.

ldaho Code 5 ?9-2602 Permits Filinq A Probation Violation Affer The
Probation Term Has Expired
The standards applicable to the construction of statutes are well

established:
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this
Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in
statutory construction. The language of the statute is to be given its
plain, obvious, and rational meaning. If the language is clear and
unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to
legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. When the
court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to
ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. To
ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words
of the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the
public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. It is
incumbent upon the court to give a statute an interpretation that will
not render it a nullity. Where ambiguity exists as to the elements of
a crime, this Court will strictly construe the criminal statute in favor
of the defendant.
135 ldaho at 646, 22 P.3d at
e,

121 (citations and internal quotations

omitted). Thus, a court facing a question of interpretation of a statute must first
determine if the statute is plain and unambiguous. If not, the court must then
resort to legislative history and rules of statutory interpretation to determine
legislative intent. Finally, only if the statute still remains ambiguous after applying
all rules of statutory construction will the court apply the rule of lenity and resolve
the remaining ambiguity in favor of the defendant.

Beard, 135 ldaho at 646, 22

ldaho Code § 19-2602 reads:
If it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the terms and
conditions upon which the defendant was placed on probation by
the court or any of them have been violated or for any other cause
satisfactory to the court, the court may, at any time within the
longest period for which the defendant might have been

originally sentenced by judgment of the court, issue a bench
warrant for the rearrest of the defendant.

I.C.
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19-2602 (emphasis added). By its plain language, a probation violation

proceeding may be commenced against a defendant "at any time within the
longest period for which the defendant might have originally been sentenced."
The maximum sentence upon conviction of the crime of burglary is 10 years. I.C.
§ 18-1403. Because the probation violation in this case was filed within 10 years

of Gamino's sentencing, the district court had jurisdiction to revoke Gamino's
probation,
In holding that ldaho Code § 19-2602 applied to Gamino's situation, the
district court reasoned:
[M]y determination is going to be that the allegation is that the
probation was not compiled with during - the allegation arose
during the four-year term in which the defendant was on probation
and that the motion for by the prosecutor is timely under 19-2602.
It was at least signed before the probation terminated. It was not
filed before the probation period set by the Court was terminated,
but it filed during the 10-year period under 19-2602.
(8111/08 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 15-23.)
Gamino's argument that ldaho Code § 19-2602 should not apply to his
situation is contrary not only to the plain language of the statute but also to rules
of statutory construction. Gamino asks this court to effectively delete the phrase,
"at any time within the longest period for which the defendant might have been
originally sentenced by judgment of the court." This is contrary to the well-settled
rules of statutory construction that prohibit interpreting a statute in such a way as
to render part of its language superfluous or to nullifL portions of it. State v.
Coleman, 128 ldaho 466, 469, 915 P.2d 28, 31 (Ct. App. 1996) (it is incumbent

upon the court to interpret the statute in such a manner that will not nullify it, and
it is not to be presumed that the legislature performed an idle act of enacting a
superfluous statute); State v. Dewbre, 133 ldaho 663, 665, 991 P.2d 388, 390
(Ct. App. 1999) (statutory construction requires statute to be read so as to
ascertain and give effect to legislative purpose and to give force and effect to
every part of the statute); Belt v. Belt, 106 ldaho 426, 431, 679 P.2d 1144, 1149
(1984) (construction of a statute should be adopted which does not deprive
provisions of the statute of their meaning). Despite these rules that prohibit
interpreting a statute in such a way as to deprive a provision of its meaning,
Gamino asks this court to give the statute just such an interpretation. Gamino's
interpretation of the statute is erroneous.
Several jurisdictions with statutes similar to I.C. § 19-2602 permit filing a
probation violation after expiration of the term of probation. Former United States
code governing probation violations allowed the filing of probation violations after
termination of probation. 18 U.S.C.A. 3653 (repealed in 1987) permitted a court
to issue a warrant for a probation violation "at any time within the probation
period, or within the maximum probation period permitted by section 3651 of this
title ...." (emphasis added). Under the provisions of former 18 U.S.C.A. 3651,
"the period of probation, together with any extension thereof, shall not exceed
five years."
Courts have interpreted this section to mean that a court could issue a
warrant and revoke an individual's probation at any time during the maximum five
year probationary period so long as the acts causing the probation violation

occured within a probationer's period of probation. United States v. O'Quinn, 689
F.2d 1359, 1360 ( l l t h Cir. 1982); United States v. Gammarano, 732 F.2d 273,
277 (2"d Cir. 1984); United States v. Blunt, 680 F.2d 1216, 1218-19 (8th Cir.
1982). Clearly, the period of probation and the period within which the court
retained jurisdiction to revoke probation were understood to be different.

United

States v. Neville, 985 F.2d 992,998 (9" Cir. 1993).
Likewise, several other states also permit commencement of probation
revocation proceedings after the probation term has expired.

The ability to

commence probation revocation proceedings after the expiration of the probation
term depends in large part on the specific wording of the state's probation
statute.

For example, Alaska's probation statutes are similar to the former

federal code and permit a trial court to revoke probation within the five-year
maximum period despite the fact that formal probation may terminate prior to the
filing of the petition to revoke probation. Galaktionoft v. Alaska, 733 P.2d 628
(Alaska App. 1987).
In construing its probation statutes,

North Dakota also allows

commencement of probation revocation proceedings on a violation during the
period of probation after a term of probation has expired. State v. Decker, 209
N.W.2d 879 (ND. 1973). The Decker court adopted the following rationale for its
interpretation of its statutes:
It seems clear that, for the proper operation of a probation system
and the attainment of the rehabilitation of the defendant at which it
aims, the court must have the power, even after the expiration of
the probationary period, to punish a violation which occurs during
the period, provided the court acts within a reasonable time after
the violation. It seems obvious that a violation which takes place on

the last day of the probationary period, or so near the end of the
probationary period that the court cannot act within the period,
should be punishable by revocation of the probation thereafter.
Similarly, a serious violation of the terms of probation which occurs
under circumstances which prevent it from coming to the attention
of the probation authorities or the court until after the expiration of
the probationary period, should be punishable promptly after the
court learns of it.
In each such case, the question reduces to whether the delay in the
revocation and the imposition of the prison sentence is reasonable.
It is sufficient that the court which imposed the probation should act
promptly after the violation is discovered or, in the case of an
accusation of a crime, after the conviction, even though the
probationary period has expired meanwhile.
Decker, 209 N.W.2d at 884, citing Commonwealth v. Duff, 192 A.2d 258, 262-63
(Pa.Super. 1963). Since Decker, the North Dakota legislature has repealed its
former probation scheme and replaced it with a statute that permits a probation
violation to be filed within 60 days of the termination of probation. N.D.C.C.

Similarly, the Nebraska Supreme Court, in interpreting its statutory
scheme, held that the trial court could exercise jurisdiction over the probationer
within a reasonable time after expiration of the term, so that probation violations
occurring on the last day of the probation could result in probation revocation
after the probationary term. Phoenix v. Nebraska, 162 Neb. 669,77 N.W.2d 237
(1956). The proceeding must commence within the probationary period or within
a reasonable time thereafter. White v. Nebraska, 193 Neb. 93, 94, 225 N.W.2d

Consistent with these cases, Idaho Code § 19-2602 permits filing a
probation violation after a probation term has expired. The period of probation

and the period within which the court can revoke probation are clearly different.
Any other reading renders the phrase, "at any time within the longest period for
which the defendant might have been originally sentenced by judgment of the
court" a nullity and is contrary to the rules of statutory construction. For this
reason, the district court did not err in revoking Gamino's probation after the term
of his probation had expired
D.

ldaho Code 5 20-222 Also Permits Filinq A Probation Violation When An
Individual Is Not On Probation
ldaho Code § 20-222 reads, in relevant part:
At any time during probation or suspension of sentence, the court
may issue a warrant for violating any of the conditions of probation
or suspension of sentence and cause the defendant to be
arrested. Thereupon the court, after summary hearing may revoke
the probation and suspension of sentence and cause the sentence
imposed to be executed, or may cause the defendant to be brought
before it and may continue or revoke the probation, or may impose
any sentence which originally might have been imposed at the time
of conviction.

ldaho Code 9 20-222 (emphasis added).
By its plain language, a probation violation proceeding may be
commenced against a defendant "at any time during probation or suspension of
sentence."

Gamino received a 7 year suspended sentence.

Because the

probation violation in this case was filed prior to the expiration of the suspended
sentence term, the district court had jurisdiction to revoke Gamino's probation.
Gamino asks this court to ignore the phrase "or suspension of sentence"
in I.C. § 20-222. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-6.) However, Gamino's interpretation is
contrary to the well-settled rules of statutory construction that prohibit interpreting

a statute in such a way as to render part of its language superfluous, and require
giving meaning to every word and phrase employed by the legislature. State v.
Coleman, 128 ldaho 466, 469, 915 P.2d 28, 31 (Ct. App. 1996). Despite these
rules that prohibit interpreting a statute in such a way as to deprive a provision of
its meaning, Gamino asks this court to give the statute just such an interpretation.
The court of appeals had read I.C. § 20-222 and I.C. § 19-2602 broadly
and has held that a judge may act upon a "violation of a clearly implied condition"
of a suspended sentence. Hancock v. State, 111 ldaho 835, 838, 727 P.2d
1263, 1266 (Ct. App. 1996). In Hancock, the sentencing court suspended all but
the first 11 months of Hancock's 10 year sentence. Hancock, 111 ldaho at 836,
727 P.2d at 1264. The sentencing court failed to mention probation either orally
or in its written order. Hancock, 111 ldaho at 836, 37, 727 P.2d at 1263, 64.
Several months later, while Hancock was serving his sentence in the county jail,
a criminal complaint was filed against him charging him with a possession of a
dangerous weapon by an inmate. Hancock, IIIldaho at 837, 727 P.2d at 1265.
While this new charge was pending, the sentencing court held a hearing to
correct the language in the original order and included probationary language in
the amended order.

Id. Hancock did not object to this. Id. Hancock admitted to

violating his probation in exchange of the state's dismissal of the new charge and
waived his right to written notice of the alleged probation violation.

Id.

Upon

Hancock's admission of the probation violation, the sentencing court reinstated
Hancock's full original sentence as amended.

Id.

Later, on appeal, Hancock argued that he was not on probation, had never
been informed of the conditions of that probation, and could not be subject to
revocation of his suspended sentence.

Id.

The state argued that even if

Hancock was not on probation or was not informed of the conditions of his
probation, that he nevertheless was subject to revocation of his suspended
sentence based on the language of I.C. § 20-222. Hancock, 111 Idaho at 838,
727 P.2d at 1266. The court of appeals agreed and held:

We note that I.C. § 19-2602 likewise provides that where a
sentence has been suspended the court may issue a bench
warrant for a violation of the terms and conditions of probation "or
for any other cause satisfactory to the court ...." "When the
defendant is brought before the court in such case ... if judgment
was originally pronounced but suspended, the original judgment
shall be in full force and effect and may be executed according to
law ...." I.C. § 19-2603.
We deem it clear that Hancock's admitted commission of a felony possession of a dangerous weapon by an inmate - was a "cause
satisfactory to the court" for revoking the suspended sentence. Of
course, we do not suggest that a judge arbitrarily may revoke a
suspended sentence for any reason that pleases him. But we do
hold that the judge may act upon violation of a clearly implied
condition such as refraining from the commission of a felony.
Id (emphasis added).
As a term of Gamino's probation, he was ordered to pay restitution and
court costs.

After his probation expired but prior to the expiration of his

suspended sentence, the judge revoked and reinstated Gamino's probation.
Even if the terms of Gamino's probation did not apply after the expiration of his
period of probation, the judge acted "upon [a] violation of a clearly implied
condition" of Gamino's suspended sentence, i.e. that he would pay his restitution,

and correctly revoked and reinstated Gamino to probation for an additional 2
years.
The plain language and interpretative case law of I.C. § 20-222 clearly
permit a probation violation to be filed against a defendant when that individual is
not on probation. Any other reading renders the language "or suspension of
sentence" a nullity and is contrary to the rules of statutory construction. The
district court had jurisdiction under I.C. § 20-222 to revoke Gamino's probation.

E.

ldaho Code 5 19-2602 and ldaho Code 6 20-222 Are Consistent And May
Be Read Harmoniously
Statutes that relate to the same subject matter are in pari materia and

should be construed together to effectuate legislative intent. Grand Canyon
Dories v. ldaho State Tax Comm'n., 124 ldaho 1, 4, 855 P.2d 462, 465 (1993).
In determining legislative intent, this court should examine the reasonableness of
the proposed interpretations and the policy behind the statutes so that all of the
applicable sections can be construed together. J.R. Simplot Co. v. ldaho State
Tax Comm'n., 120 ldaho 849, 854, 820 P.2d 1206, 1212 (1991). When statutes
cannot be read consistently, however, different rules apply. Where two statutes
appear to apply to the same case, the specific should control over the general.
K. Hefner, Inc. v. Caremark, 128 ldaho 726, 732, 918 P.2d 595, 601 (1996)
(citing, Citv of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Hiqhwav District., 126 ldaho 145,
149, 879 P.2d 1078, 1082 (1994). See also, State v. Tavlor, 58 ldaho 656, 667,
78 P.2d 125, 130 (1938) ("Where two acts deal with a common subject-matter,
the one which deals with it in the more minute and particular way will prevail.").

ldaho Code § 19-2602 and ldaho Code § 20-222 are consistent. ldaho
Code § 20-222 allows the court to issue a warrant for a probation violation during
the term of probation or suspension of sentence.

ldaho Code § 19-2602

provides that a court may issue a warrant on a probation violation "at any time
within the longest period for which the defendant might have been originally
sentenced." There is no inconsistency because "during probation or suspension
of sentence," I.C. § 20-222, and "the longest period for which the defendant
might have originally been sentenced," I.C.

5 19-2602, are entirely compatible, at

least for purposes of this case. Both statutes permit the filing of a probation
revocation when an individual is not on probation. Both statutes contemplate that
a probation violation may not be known until after the probation term has expired
or that a probation violation may occur so close to the end of the term of
probation that it is impractical for the state to discover and prosecute the violation
prior to the expiration of the probation term.

To construe these statutes

otherwise requires this court to ignore the plain language of the statutes. This
reading also permits the statutes to be read in harmony with each other.
Gamino's asserts that to the extent that I.C. § 20-222 and I.C. § 19-2602
conflict, I.C.

3 20-222 controls. However, as discussed above, the district court

had jurisdiction to revoke his probation under either statute. To hold otherwise
ignores the plain language of both statutes and nullifies the phrases "suspension
of a sentence" in I.C. § 20-222 and "at any time within the longest period for
which the defendant might have been originally sentenced by judgment of the
court" in I.C. Ij 19-2602.

Gamino has failed to show that the district court erred when it failed to
dismiss his motion to dismiss his probation violation. After reviewing ldaho Code
§ 19-2602 and ldaho Code § 20-222, the district court correctly concluded it

could extend Gamino's probation an additional two years.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Harrison Gamino's
conviction and sentence.
DATED this 19" day of October, 2009.
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